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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Appeals No. 940209

vs.

Category No. 16

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H.
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON
V. HOLBROOK, DONALD S. COLOVICH
WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, DARIN G.
WOOLSTENHULME, JENNIFER MacARHTUR,
RITA M. KENNEDY and/or U.S.
FOREST SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON,
and JOHN DOES 1 through 5,

(subject to pour-over
jurisdiction)

Defendants/Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case arises from injuries suffered by Plaintiff in a
multi-vehicle automobile accident which took place in Davis County,
State of Utah, on December 10, 1989. Jurisdiction and venue were
deemed by the Court to be proper in the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County, State of Utah.
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to §78-22(3) (j), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended 1992), and Article VIII
Section 5, Constitution of Utah. This case is subject to the pourover jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to §78-2-2(4), Utah
Code Ann (1953, as amended 1992).

ISSUES
The parties at issue in this appeal were dismissed from the
proceedings on motions for summary judgment.

The Court in its

Amended Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment framed
the issue as follows:
The issue before the Court is, given the facts as alleged
by plaintiff, whether plaintiff's allegations can support
a finding of proximate causation as to each defendant.
For the purpose of summary judgment only, the Court will
assume without deciding that plaintiff has alleged
sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part
of the defendants.
Therefore, Plaintiff will frame the issues as follows:
1.

When viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, was

the negligence of John Doe No. 1 (the unidentified semi-truck
driver) a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries?
2.

Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to

Plaintiff, was the negligence of Jennifer MacArthur a proximate
cause of the injuries and damages suffered by Plaintiff?
3.
Plaintiff,

Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to
was

the

negligence

of

Defendant

Woolstenhulme

a

proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Plaintiff?
4.

Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to

Plaintiff, was the negligence of Defendant Colovich a proximate
cause of the injuries suffered by Plaintiff?

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is an appeal from the granting of Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment.
evidence

exists

The Trial Court determined that
as

to

the

issue

of

causation

as

"no direct
to

these

Defendants."
A trial court's grant of summary judgement is reviewed under
a "correctness" standard.

Daniels v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan

Assoc., 771 P.2d 1100, 11001-02 (Utah App.), cert denied, 783 P.2d
53 (Utah 1989).

The Appellate Court should accord no deference to

the trial court's conclusion that the facts are not in dispute nor
the court's legal conclusions based on those facts. See Wycalis v.
Guardian Title. 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App 1989), cert denied, 789
P. 2d 33 (Utah 1990).

When reviewing an order granting summary

judgment, the facts are to be liberally construed "in favor of the
parties opposing the motion, and those parties are to be given the
benefit of all inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the
evidence."

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah

1991).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
This case was determined by summary judgment entered by the
Court, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 56

provides:
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
3

declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
The motion
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed
for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount
of damages.
Utah

Law

appears

unclear

with

regard

to

"superseding

intervening cause" and the conflicts created between Harris v. Utah
Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) and Hillvard v. Utah
By-Prodcuts Co.. 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953). A question presented is
whether "foreseeability" of an intervening act is a question of
fact or law.
Plaintiff

believes

the

following

authority

is

also

determinative in this case, Harris, id. , Godesky v. Provo City
Corp.. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984), Restatement of Torts. Second,
sections 442 A, 442 B, and 444, Jensen v. Mountain States Tel, and
Tel. Co. , 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980), Steffensen v. Smiths Management
Corp..

820

P.2d

482

(Utah App.

1991),

Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985).
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Mitchell

v.

Pearson

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A- FACTS
1.

On December

10, 1989, at approximately

8:40 p.m.,

Plaintiff was a passenger in a automobile being driven by appellee
MacArthur. (Clark p.55 1.6-9)
2.

Plaintiff suffered personal injuries as a result of

multiple car automobile collision which occurred on the State Road
89 overpass over 1-15 southbound in Farmington City, Davis County,
State of Utah. The collision on structure 3C-594, as point 7 miles
south of milepost 334.
3.

(R.6 520).

Accident investigation and reconstruction established

that the collision sequence was initiated after Defendant Gilbert
lost control of his vehicle and came to rest, stalled, in the right
hand lane of traffic.

(R.630; deposition of Gilbert p.14 1.9 to

p.16 1.16.)
4.

Rita Kennedy then approached the accident area, where she

observed Gilbert's car stopped in the middle of the two southbound
lanes and a person standing outside the car waiving his hands.
Rita swerved to the left to avoid the car, as she did so she lost
control of the vehicle, struck the guardrail several times and her
vehicle came to rest in the roadway.

Rita exited her vehicle and

saw

these

oncoming

vehicles.

tractor/ trailer.

One

of

vehicles

was

semi-

She feared that her vehicle would be struck by
5

these vehicles. She jumped over the guardrail to the east and did
not see any collision events after jumping over the guardrail.
(R.273)
5.

The next vehicle into the accident scene was John Doe #1,

the unidentified semi-truck. John Doe #1 veered suddenly from the
right hand lane to the left hand lane, presumably to avoid striking
Gilbert, and "cut off" the MacArthur vehicle which was closing
rapidly on the semi from behind. The semi made no contact with any
other vehicle and proceeded down the road. (R. 629, f 7; R. 272,
Deposition of Greg DuVal, exhibit 1, investigators report).
6.

Appellee MacArthur was driving southbound on U.S. 89

entering 1-15.
per hour.
7.

MacArthur was traveling approximately 60-65 miles

(Deposition of Clark,

p.5 1.20; R.330)

The MacArthur car had been passing other vehicles on the

roadway (Clark p. 58 1. 2) and seemed to be gaining on the truck as
it swung in front of MacArthur (Clark p.57 1. 16).
8.

Defendant MacArthur attempted to take evasive actions

from the semi by braking and turning. This caused the car to go to
of control and come to rest against the left hand guardrail facing
backwards into on coming traffic.

(R.629; deposition of MacArthur

p.14 1.2-4 and p.15 1.24 to p.16 1.2)
9.

Clark remembers seeing Gilbert approach the MacArthur car

saying he was sorry, his car had stalled and he needed help. Brad
6

Clark thought he should get out of the car to help Gilbert.

Brad

Clark does not remember exiting the car and has no memory until
after he was placed on a stretcher by the paramedics. (Clark p.59
1.21 to p.61 1.1). Gilbert does not remember seeing Clark exit the
car.

Appellee MacArthur remembers Brad opening the rear door of

the vehicle as if to get out.

(MacArthur p.18 1.6-7, p.19 1.20-

21) .
10.

Appellees Hopkins and Woolstenhulme were stopped side by

side on a red light southbound on Highway 89 about to enter the
freeway interchange.

Hopkins (p.15 1.14 to p.15 1.24; R. 629).

Defendant Woolstenhulme drove a four wheel drive Chevrolet pick-up
truck which was in four wheel drive at the time. Defendant Hopkins
drove a jeep Cherokee which was in two wheel drive.
1.14-16).
p.20

(Hopkins p.22

Both vehicles proceeded on the green light.

(Hopkins

1.18, et seq.) Woolstenhulme in an initial interview stated

that he saw the semi-tractor "cut off" the MacArthur vehicle, the
MacArthur vehicle go out of control and strike the guardrail.
(DuVal, exhibit 1; R.272; R.629 19).
11.

Despite what he had seen and being in four wheel drive,

appellee Woolstenhulme drove into the accident scene and crashed
into at least one pedestrian, struck the MacArthur and Kennedy
vehicles.

Woolstenhulme came to rest sideways

in the road,

blocking the left hand lane. (Woolstenhulme p. 11, 1.10 to p. 12 1.
7

18, DuVal p.49 1.16-19; R. 628 flO).
12.

Defendant Hopkins witnessed the vehicles on the road and

the other crashes and came to a stop in the left hand lane prior to
the accident location.

Hopkins was then bumped from the rear by

Defendant Adamson who went on to strike the side of appellee
Woolstenhulme's truck (Hopkins p.15 1.14 to p.16 1.24; R. 628 f 11) .
13.

Hopkins remained stopped in the road before being struck

from the rear by appellee Colovich at a high rate of speed.
Hopkins' vehicle then collided with the front of MacArthur's
vehicle, causing the MacArthur vehicle to move further backward (or
forward depending on perspective) before the vehicles came to a
rest.

(Colovich p.15 1.15-19; R. 628 112).
14.

Rita Kennedy, who had exited her vehicle and jumped over

the guardrail for safety, had been over the guardrail for "a few
seconds when Brad Clark came flying over the guardrail". (R.628
J13; R.272; DuVal exhibit 1 p.3).
15.

Plaintiff suffered

injuries to his person including

derangement of the right knee, severed anterior cruciate ligament
and a femoral condile lesion; a sever laceration of the fist web
space of his right hand, transecting the first dorsal interosseous
muscle as well as the insertion, the IP joint tendon was partially
shredded and over 50% transected and the ulnar digital nerve was
severed.

The flexor pollices longus tendon was also severed from
8

the bone.

The Appellant suffered special damages in excess of

$21,000. (R.3 J[30) •
16.

Appellee MacArthur was injured while sitting in her

vehicle as a result of subsequent collisions (MacArthur p. 11 1.2-4,
p.19 1.11-15).

MacArthur suffered injuries to her leg and knee,

leaving her temporarily unable to walk, her face was badly cut,
swollen and bandaged and her jaws were wire shut (MacArthur p.17
1.9-12; Clark p.62 1.6).
17. From the time appellee MacArthur's vehicle came to a rest
until the last collision seemed to happen "instantly" (MacArthur
p.56 1.1-6; R. 379 f 8).
18.
some

Plaintiff's expert Greg DuVal stated his opinion with

additional

Woolstenhulme

specific

were

guilty

claims

that

of driving

appellees

Colovich

too

for

fast

and

existing

conditions. (DuVal p.109 1.18-25; p.121 1.2-16).

19.

Plaintiff's expert Greg DuVal stated his opinion based on

adequate foundation excluded here, that Brad Clark was most likely
injured as a result of the impact between appellee Woolstenhulme
and appellee MacArthur.
20.

(DuVal p.60 1.8-11)

Plaintiff retained the services of Dave Stephens as a

human factors expert. Stephens was asked in his deposition whether
he had an opinion of how Brad Clark was injured.

It was Dave

Stephens opinion that Plaintiff was most likely injured as a result
9

of being struck directly by the Hopkins jeep after it was hit and
pushed forward by appellee Colovich, or he may have been struck
directly by appellee Colovich. (Stephens p.37 1.25, R.590)
B. NATURE OF THE CASE AND PROCEEDINGS.
A negligence action was filed by Plaintiff seeking recovery
for personal injuries suffered in the multi-vehicle automobile
collision.

As a result of injuries suffered in the accident,

Plaintiff claims special damages in excess of $21,000.
Based upon the initial investigation and reconstruction, it
was believed that Plaintiff was likely injured when the MacArthur
vehicle was struck in head-on fashion by the Woolstenhulme vehicle,
or as a result of a chain of collisions caused by the improper
lookout of Defendant Colovich. Plaintiff's expert rendered an
opinion that all drivers involved in the accident were negligent in
failing to maintain a proper lookout and in driving too fast for
existing conditions, in addition to other negligence.

Defendant

John Doe was additionally negligent in making a lane change when it
could not be done with reasonable safety. The evasive maneuver of
the semi truck was witnessed by Plaintiff and Defendant MacArthur,
thereby constituting a hit and run which would be subject to
insurance

coverage

under

the

Farmers

Uninsured

Motorist

endorsement. Following the investigation and reconstruction of the
accident, and Plaintiff filed a claim for compensation against the
10

named parties.
On or about January 28, 1992, Defendant Hopkins filed a motion
for summary judgment on the issue of proximate causation.

That

matter was briefed, the Court denied that motion on January 30,
1992.

Thereafter, Plaintiff made partial settlements in this case

with Defendant King (July 29, 1991) ; Defendant Adamson (October 22,
1992); Defendant Hopkins (December 30, 1992); Defendant Holbrook
(December 4, 1992); and Defendant Gilbert

(August

6,

1993).

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claim against Rita M. Kennedy
and the U.S. Forest Service on February 10, 1994.

All remaining

parties and causes of action were concluded by the Court's order of
summary judgment June 13, 1994.
ARGUMENT
A. Preliminary Matters
THE TORT REFORM ACT REQUIRES JOINDER OF ALL PARTIES SHARING ANY
PROPORTION OF LIABILITY
Pursuant to the Tort Reform Act of 1986, Plaintiff was
required in this action to join any Defendant who may have shared
in the fault. Section 78-27-41 provides:
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is
a party to the litigation, may join as parties any
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective proportions
of fault.
Plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages attributable to
11

any Defendant who is not a party to the action.

§78-27-38, Utah

Code Ann. (1953, as amended 1986). No Defendant is liable for more
than that Defendant's pro-rata share of fault, which again requires
Plaintiff to join any party that may have caused or contributed to
the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. §78-27-40, Utah Code Ann.
(1953, as amended 1986).
The Tort Reform Act of 1986 required Plaintiff to join any and
all Defendants who may have shared any percentage of the fault
resulting in the injuries suffered by Plaintiff herein.
JOHN DOE NO. 1 IS AN UNINSURED MOTORIST UNDER
THE FARMERS' POLICY
This issue does not require much discussion, but is presented
simply to clarify any questions that may arise in the Court's mind
regarding the actions and propriety of John Doe #1 being named as
a party to this action.
This

action

arose

after

Responsibility Act of 1987.

the

amendment

to

the

Safety

The uninsured motorist statute is

codified as §31A-22-305, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended 1987).
The applicable sections provided the following at the time this
accident occurred:
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons"
includes:
. . .
(c) any person occupying a motor vehicle
referred to in the policy or owned by a self-insurer;
*

*

*

12

(2)
As used in this section, "uninsured motor
vehicle" includes:
. . . (b) an unidentified motor vehicle that left
the scene of an accident proximately caused by its
operator;
*

*

*

(5) When a covered person claims an uninsured motor
vehicle under Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an
accident without touching the covered person or the
vehicle occupied by the covered person, then the covered
person shall show the existence of the other motor
vehicle by clear and convincing evidence, that consists
of more than the covered person's testimony.
The existence of John Doe #1 has been established by prior
testimony

of

Brad

Clark,

appellee

MacArthur

and

appellee

Woolstenhulme. In addition, the presence of the semi is supported
by the statement given by Rita Kennedy that she saw the semi
approaching and exited her car and jumped over the guardrail.
Therefore, the requirements of bringing a cause of action under the
uninsured motorist statute have been met and John Doe #1 is a
proper party to this action and is covered by appellee Farmers
Insurance Group, dba Farmers Insurance Exchange.
POINT I
NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT
TO BE DETERMINED BY JURY
According to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary judgment is only appropriate
"if
the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
13

issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
In a negligence action, the question of liability
question of fact to be determined by the jury.

is a

Silcox v. Skaaas

Alpha Beta, Inc. , 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) , Hunt v. Hurst.
785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990).
Likewise, the issue of causation presents a question of fact
to be determined by the jury.
The first actor cannot excuse himself from liability
arising from his negligent acts merely because the later
negligence of another concurs to cause injury, if the
later act were a foreseeable event.
Godesky v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).
Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983).

Harris v.

The Godesky court further went on to state:
An intervening negligent act does not automatically
become a superseding cause that relieves the original
actor of liability. The earlier actor is charged with
the foreseeable negligent acts of others. Therefore, if
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier
negligent act is a concurring cause. "[T]his includes
situations where negligent or other wrongful conduct of
others should reasonably be anticipated." (cites omitted)
Godesky. at 545.
The Trial Court, in his minute entry and ruling regarding this
case assumed for the purpose of his minute entry that Plaintiff had
alleged sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part of
Defendants.

This was consistent with the Memorandum of Defendant

MacArthur, who at paragraph 4 of her principle memorandum (R.347)
14

stated "MacArthur assumes there are sufficient issues of fact
regarding the claims of her negligence to preclude summary judgment
on that issue.
POINT II
QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDE THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS TO JOHN DOE NO. 1.
John Doe #1 was the unidentified semi driver who constitutes
a hit and run driver subject to uninsured motorist coverage as
specified in the second preliminary statement in this brief. John
Doe #1 was covered by a policy issued by appellee Farmers Insurance
Exchange who was represented by Robert Jeffs along with appellee
MacArthur who was also represented by Robert Jeffs.
It should be noted that at no time did Farmers Insurance
Exchange or John Doe #1 file a Motion for Summary Judgement.

The

ruling of the trial court, entered sua sponte, granted summary
judgment in favor of Farmers Insurance Exchange expressly on the
theory of proximate cause.

The facts provide that John Doe,

without warning or notice, veered into the lane of travel of
Defendant MacArthur causing her car to go out of control, spin and
strike the guardrail.
injured.

All the passengers in the MacArthur were

The question of uninsured coverage was neither brought

before the Court nor addressed and the Court issued its ruling
solely on the issue of proximate cause.

The test for proximate

cause as provided by the Utah Supreme Court in Harris v. Utah
15

Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), is stated
Whether under the particular circumstances [defendant]
should have foreseen that [defendant's] conduct would
have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and
this includes situations where negligent or other
wrongful conduct of others should reasonably be
anticipated.
Harris at 220.
John

Doe had just

approached

an area

of great hazard.

Gilbert's car was parked in the middle of the two southbound lanes
and Kennedy's car further up the road was stalled in the left hand
southbound lane.

Only through considerable effort, and running

MacArthur off the road was John Doe able to navigate the hazard.
It would be foreseeable to a motorist running another motorist off
the road that the motorist run off the road may suffer injuries or
damages as a result of that maneuver. Likewise, leaving a motorist
stranded in a hazardous setting, such as the one existing at the
time, would create a foreseeable danger for the motorist left on
the high speed roadway in the dark. Questions of fact exist as to
John Doe's negligence and that negligence creating a foreseeable
risk of harm to the occupants of the MacArthur vehicle.

The

granting of judgment in favor of John Doe and Farmers Insurance
Exchange was an error and should be set aside.

The question of

proximate cause should be submitted to the finder of fact.
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POINT III
QUESTIONS OF FACT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT MACARTHUR.
Defendant MacArthur's motion for summary judgment claimed that
Summary Judgment should be granted on two alternative grounds,
either that MacArthur's negligence had "come to a rest before the
actions or causes occurred which produced Plaintiff's injuries"
(R.346) or that the actions of Plaintiff or other Defendants
constituted

an

unforseeable

independent

intervening

cause

superseding Defendant MacArthur's acts (R.345, 344).
It is established law that summary judgment is proper only if
the evidence, depositions, affidavits and admissions, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, show that
there is no issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jensen v. Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980).
Defendant MacArthur acknowledged for the purpose of her motion
that sufficient questions of fact existed to preclude summary
judgment on the issue of liability. Therefore, this brief assumes
an acknowledgment of duty and breach of duty, simply for the
purpose of the arguments regarding proximate cause.
The reason for this assumption is based upon the general
factual circumstances surrounding the superseding, intervening
cause theories of proximate causation.
17

Those cases are generally

based upon the termination of a first parties negligence or where
a second negligent act is deemed to be superseding. While summary
judgment may be granted solely on the issue of proximate cause "in
a situation involving independent intervening cause, the primary
issue is one of the foreseeability of the subsequent negligent
conduct of a third person, and in this case, that issue must be
resolved by the finder of fact." Jensen, supra.
[0]ne cannot excuse himself from liability arising from his
negligent acts merely because the later negligence of another
concurs to cause an injury, if the latter act was a
legally
foreseeable
event.
Jensen, at 365-6.
Defendant MacArthur would now have the court believe that her
negligence is terminated, as a matter of law, because subsequent
negligence of other Defendants, and speculatory actions taken by
Plaintiff, caused or contributed to Plaintiffs injuries. This is
simply an inappropriate test.
The theories of law relied upon by appellee MacArthur arise
from the so called "first prong" of the rules stated in Hillyard v.
Utah By-Products. 263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953). Harris v. Utah Transit
Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) stated the rule as follows:
*

*

*

In other words, the test in Hillyard is two-pronged: (1)
where a motorist sees a stationary object in the road and
negligently fails to avoid it, his negligence is, as a
matter of law, a superseding cause, but (2) if the
motorist negligently fails to see the stationary object
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in time to avoid it, the issue of whether the motorist's
negligence is a superseding cause is for the jury.
The case most heavily relied on in Hillyard to
support the first prong of the rule here stated has been
overruled. Kline v. Mover. 191 A. 43 (Pa 1937) , was
expressly overruled by Grainy v. Campbell 425 A.2d 379
(1981), which rejected the rule of superseding cause in
Kline and adopted the rule stated in 447 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See also Henniaan v.
Atlantic Refining Co.. 282 F. Supp. 667, 678-79
*

*

*

Finally, the unsound distinction made in Hillyard
serves to frustrate the purpose of the Comparative
Negligence Statute by precluding the kind of comparison
of fault that a jury ought to make. The allocation of
liability should be made on the basis of the relative
culpability of both parties. To do that the jury must
assess the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
second
driver7s
actions
in
light
of
all
the
circumstances, including whatever action it takes to
avoid a collision, his initial speed, the initial speed
of the first car, road conditions, traffic conditions and
the like.
To avoid further confusion in doctrine of
superseding causation in cases such as this, we hereby
overrule the first prong of the Hillyard test as stated
in Hillyard, McMurdie, Valesquez, and Anderson.
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983).
Defendant
control

and

MacArthur

crashed

negligently

drove her vehicle,

into the guardrail.

The

lost

question then

presented is whether Plaintiff was injured in a "direct unbroken
sequence which produces the injury."

And whether the injury

suffered by Plaintiff would have been incurred had Defendant
MacArthur not been negligent. Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d
541 (Utah 1984).

Certainly, had MacArthur not lost control of her
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vehicle, and crashed on the roadway, Plaintiff would not have been
subsequently

injured.

MacArthur

testified

that

the

entire

occurrence seemed to happen immediately, or "instantaneously11. As
such, the injury happened in a direct unbroken sequence of events.
The negligent action of others could reasonably have been
anticipated in this case. The Kennedy vehicle had already gone out
of control and was stalled in the number two or inside lane.

The

Gilbert vehicle had already stalled and was blocking the number one
lane.

There were no other lanes of travel, with the exception of

an emergency lane on the right side of the road.

The fact that

three vehicles had already been involved in the accident should
have been ample evidence that further collisions may take place.
In addition, MacArthur would have the court believe that it is
negligence, per se, for a person to exit a motor vehicle after an
accident occurs. Defendant Kennedy exited her vehicle, and sought
safety over the guardrail where she was found unharmed after the
collision

events occurred.

In

fact, with the exception of

MacArthur and Heather Reeves, the passenger in the MacArthur
vehicle, all parties involved in this motor vehicle accident exited
their cars at some point.

The exiting of the motor vehicle is

neither unforeseeable, nor negligent.
The first actor cannot excuse himself from liability
arising from his negligent acts merely because the later
negligence of another concurs to cause injury, if the
later act were a foreseeable event.
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Jensen, at 458; Harris, at 220.
While Defendant MacArthur would have this Court rule that her
negligence had "come to a rest," the Court should note that
MacArthur

and

her

passenger

Heather

Reeves

remained

in the

MacArthur vehicle which was subsequently struck and both women
received serious injuries. Remaining in the MacArthur vehicle was
obviously a dangerous choice. On the other hand/ Defendant Kennedy
exited her vehicle and sought shelter on the east side of the
guardrail. Kennedy was not injured in the accident (See affidavit
of Greg DuVal attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Hopkins' Motion for Summary Judgment incorporated herein
by this reference).
The courts have consistently

held that the question of

proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
While the Harris court overruled the first prong of the Hillyard
test, partially based on the comparative negligence statute, the
court stated the test of foreseeability as follows:
In applying the test of foreseeability to situations
where a negligently created pre-existing condition
combined with a later act of negligence causing an
injury, courts have drawn a clear cut distinction between
two classes of cases....the second situation involves
conduct of a later intervening actor who negligently
fails to observe the dangerous condition until it is too
late
to avoid it.... With respect to the second
situation, where the second actor fails to see the danger
in time to avoid it, it is held that a jury question
exists, based upon the rationale that it can reasonably
be anticipated that circumstances may arise wherein
21

others may not observe the dangerous condition until too
late to escape it. (emphasis added)
Harris, at 221
The Utah Supreme Court also held in Godesky "•..proximate
causation is generally a matter of fact to be determined by the
jury.

Watters v. Querrv, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981).

Provo City, 69 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1984).

Godeskv v.

The Godeskv court

further went on to state
An intervening negligent act does not automatically
become a superseding cause that relieves the original
actor of liability. The earlier actor is charged with
the foreseeable negligent acts of others. Therefore, if
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier
negligent act is a concurring cause. "[T]his includes
situations where negligent or other wrongful conduct of
others should reasonably be anticipated." (cites omitted)
Godesky, at 545.
Further clarification can be obtained by review of the
Restatement of Torts, Second.
SECTION 442 A.
Conduct

The restatement provides

Intervening Force Risked By Actor's

Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases
the foreseeable risk of harm through the intervention of
another force, and is a substantial factor in causing the
harm, intervention is not a superseding cause. ***
SECTION 442 B. Intervening Force Cause Causing Same Harm
as That Risk by Actors Conduct
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases
the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial factor in
causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought about
through the intervention of another force does not relieve the
actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally
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caused by a third person and is not within the scope of the
risk created by the actors conduct.
Defendant MacArthur's loss of control of her vehicle and
causing it to crash on the roadway left Plaintiff in a dangerous
situation. While the car was safely travelling on the freeway, the
risk of the type of injury incurred herein was nonexistent.
However, once the vehicle crashed and came to a stop on the
freeway, there was a substantial risk of further injury as a result
of subsequent drivers coming upon the scene of the accident.
It would seem reasonably foreseeable to any prudent person,
that leaving a person on an icy freeway, either on foot or in a
vehicle, would

foreseeably

result

in injury to that person.

Defendant MacArthur is now asking this Court to determine as a
matter of law that under the comparative negligence doctrine a jury
should not be allowed to decide her negligence. Such questions are
properly questions for the jury.

Harris, at 222.

It should be noted that the conduct of MacArthur increased the
risk to Plaintiff and certainly was a substantial

factor in

bringing about the harm ultimately suffered by the Plaintiff in
this case.

Under the Restatement, the fact that the harm is

brought about through the intervention of another force does not
relieve Defendant MacArthur of liability.
Additionally,

Defendant states that Plaintiff exited the

vehicle onto a dark icy freeway.
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While that fact has not been

established, and has been contested, even the act of leaving the
vehicle would not relieve Defendant MacArthur from being found to
have been the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries.
The Restatement of Torts provides:
SECTION 444.
Disturbance

Acts Done Under Impulsion of Emotional

An act done by another in normal response to fear or emotional
disturbance to which the actors negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in subjecting the other is not a superseding cause of harm
done by the other's act to himself or a third person.
The

issue

is whether, assuming

the

negligent

crash of

Defendant MacArthur, her proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries is
cut off by his exiting the vehicle after the crash. The deposition
testimony, and facts previously available, indicate that Defendant
Gilbert was stalled on the freeway.

Plaintiff had a specific

recollection that he needed to help Defendant Gilbert or someone
was going to get hurt. Plaintiff Clark would not have been subject
to the sudden urge and desire to help Defendant Gilbert, had
MacArthur not crashed her car on the freeway, directly opposite
Gilbert's location.

The response of Plaintiff, to get out of the

car and help other people so that no one would be hurt, would be a
normal response to the dangerous situation created by Gilbert and
to which Plaintiff was subjected as a direct result of the
negligent acts of Defendant MacArthur.
The question of proximate cause is a question of fact to be
24

determined by the jury.

Although Defendant MacArthur claims her

negligence had "come to a rest" that is the first prong of the
Hillvard test which was overruled by the Utah Supreme Court in
Harris.
nor

the

Neither the actions of any intervening negligent party,
alleged

negligence

of

Plaintiff

are

sufficiently

unforeseeable to allow the court to determine as a matter of law
that Defendant MacArthur was not a concurrent and/or contributing
cause to the injuries suffered by Plaintiff. Because questions of
fact exist and the law provides that proximate cause is a question
of

fact

for the

jury, this

court

should

reverse

Defendant

MacArthur's Order of Summary Judgment.
POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR APPELLEE WOOLSTENHULME WAS IMPROPER
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that summary
judgment should be granted in negligence cases only in the "most
clear instances."

English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993);

Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); see also Apache
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); Bowen v.
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
comparative

negligence

state.

Where

there

Because Utah is a
are

legitimate

inferences that multiple parties were negligent, it is not for a
court to decide the case as a matter of law. The task of measuring
the relative degree of negligence is for the trier of fact.
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The

Supreme Court has held:
Even though plaintiff may have been negligent,
summary judgment is an altogether inappropriate procedure
for assessing her degree of negligence against the
negligence of the defendants.
In the days when
contributory negligence was an absolute defense in a
negligence action, summary judgment could be used to
dispose of negligence actions without depriving a
plaintiff of his right to a trial on the merits. Now,
however, contributory negligence is not an absolute
defense, and summary judgment is rarely an appropriate
remedy for resolving negligence actions.
English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993), quoting Williams v.
Melvv, 699 P.2d at 723 (Utah 1985)
In sum, the issue of proximate cause should be taken from the
jury only where: (1) there is no evidence to establish a causal
connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2)
where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be
derived from the evidence on proximate causation. Steffensen v.
Smiths Management Corp. 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App 1991); Robertson v.
Sixpence Inns of America, Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, (Az 1990).
There is substantial evidence to establish a causal connection
in this case.

Plaintiff's expert stated

"the most probable

mechanism of the injuries was the sequence of crashes caused by the
Woolstenhulme truck"

(R.620 f5) .

Plaintiff remembers

seeing

Gilbert approach the vehicle and reaching for door with the intent
to

get

out

and

then

blacking

out.

(Clark

p.61

1.13-21).

Woolstenhulme's truck then collides with MacArthur's vehicle and
strikes a person believed to be either Gilbert or Brad Clark (DuVal
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p.63 1.20-21) . "Brad had to be out of the car and moving somewhere
in that area. But he was hit at about the same time the MacArthur
car was hit. . . But the impact between Woolstenhulme and MacArthur
would appear, due to the force involved, as the one that caused him
to be hurt."

(DuVal p.60 1.1-11).

There is amble evidence upon which a jury could find appellee
Woolstenhulme was negligent and his negligence was the proximate
cause of injuries to Brad Clark. The granting of summary judgment
in favor of appellee Woolstenhulme should be reversed.
POINT V
QUESTIONS OP PACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
APPELLEE COLOVICH
The Court held in its ruling in this case that the jury would
be left to speculate as to the issue of probable cause as to all
Defendants. There was adequate evidence before the court that the
negligence of appellee Colovich caused or contributed to the
injuries suffered by Brad Clark.
Colovich relies upon Mitchell v. Pearson Enterp.. supra, for
the proposition that Plaintiff must produce evidence that the
negligence, if any, has a causal connection with Plaintiff's
injuries.
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P. 2d 240 (Utah 1985),
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's summary judgment
for defendant on the issue of proximate causation because the court
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found no evidence of proximate cause and determined thatf without
evidence, the issue would have been left to juror speculation. In
Mitchell, dependents of a murdered hotel guest brought a wrongful
death action against the hotel after the deceased had been
unexplainedly murdered in his hotel room.

Plaintiffs sought to

prove that the hotel management was negligent in its security
measures and that such negligence proximately caused the murder. On
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's summary
judgment for the defendant. The court held that because there was
no evidence as to how the murderer entered the deceased's room,
plaintiffs had failed to show a factual connection between the
negligent security measures and the murder. The Mitchell court
recognized that the murderer could have entered the room in a
number of ways, many of which would have had no connection with the
hotel's security measures, including by invitation of the deceased.
Because plaintiffs bore the burden to show defendant's conduct was
a "substantial causative factor that led to the [guest's) death,"
id. at 246, and because plaintiffs had offered no evidence other
than mere speculation as to how the murderer got in the room,
summary judgment on the issue of proximate causation was proper.
In Mitchell the Plaintiff was unable to establish how the
perpetrator entered the victim's room.

Some question was raised

whether the parties were friends, whether the perpetrator had been
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invited into the room, or had otherwise arrived.

In the present

case, the testimony of Dave Stephens was reasonably clear that Brad
Clark was either struck by appellee Colovich, struck by jeep which
was struck by appellee Colovich, or struck by MacArthur's car after
being hit by the jeep. The jeep was stopped on the roadway before
being hit by appellee Colovich.
It was the deposition of David Stephens that Brad Clark was
hit by appellee Colovich's Buick or hit by Hopkins' jeep which had
been hit by appellee Colovich's Buick. (deposition of Stephens p.37
1.25 et seq).
Summary judgment is available "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file,, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, a court must consider all of
the facts and evidence presented, and every reasonable
inference arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion. Bowen v. Riverton City,
656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Morris v. Farnsworth Motel. 259
P.2d 297 (1953).
Katzenberger v. State of Utah ,735 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1987);
Based upon the evidence which was presented to the trial
court, a reasonable inference arises that Plaintiff was injured as
a result of a direct collision or a result of the collision
sequence initiated by appellee Colovich. There were adequate facts
from which a jury could determine that appellee Colovich caused or
contributed significantly to the injuries and damages suffered by
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Brad Clark.
Summary judgment in favor of appellee Colovich was improper
when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.
That ruling should be set aside and this matter should be remanded
for trial.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff requests this Court to set aside the rulings of the
trial court and remand this case for trial.

Appellees Farmers

Insurance and MacArthur have obtained summary judgment on a theory
of negligence coming to a rest and superseding intervening cause.
Those theories were overruled by the Supreme Court which held the
issues constituted a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
This Court should also set aside summary judgment for appellee
Woolstenhulme and Colovich as adequate evidence exists regarding
the negligence and causation of each of these appellees to justify
the case being submitted to the jury.
DATED AND SIGNED this ,-7 '"" day of July, 1994.

JAMES G. CLARK
Attorney for the Appellant
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Defendants7 Motion for Summary Judgment
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Judgment
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Summary Judgment
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A-1.

The Court's Ruling of April 22. 1993

Bwrti vkjAciaMWrict Court of
Utab Couaty. SUi* ol Utah.
CARMA B. SMITH. O r k

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Case No. 910400220
V.

Judge Lynn W. Davis
FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, etal.,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Farmer's Insurance Exchange,

On April 15, 1993, the Court heard oral

argument on the motions. The Court, having duly considered the arguments of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following:
RULING
A motion for summary judgment may only be granted when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.Pro
56. In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to support a finding of (1) a duty to plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a causal
link between the negligent conduct of the defendant and the injury suffered by plaintiff, and
(4) damages. The issue before the Court is, given the facts as alleged by plaintiff, whether
plaintiff's allegations can support a finding of proximate causation as to each defendant. For
">.

the purpose of summary judgment only, the Court will assume without deciding that plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part of the defendants.
Proximate causation can be defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without
which'the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Mitchell at 245-46. Additionally,
plaintiff bears the burden to show initially that the defendants conduct was a "substantial
causative factor" leading to plaintiffs injury. Mitchell at 246.
This case can be compared to the facts in Mitchell. In Mitchell, plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action after Mr, Mitchell was found dead in his hotel room. Plaintiffs were
successful in alleging facts sufficient to establish negligent conduct but the court determined
that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any direct evidence linking Mitchell's death and the
alleged negligent conduct. The court found that since there was an absence of direct
evidence on causation, the jury would be left to speculation. Mitchell at 246. The court
stated that "[w]hen proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a
matter of law." ]d.; Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah
1982).
While it is true that the issue of proximate cause is generally considered a question of
fact, the court may take the question away from the factfinder when appropriate.

Mitchell

v. Pearson Enterprises. 687 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). See also Steffensen v. Smith's
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Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991). If reasonable inferences can be
drawn from the evidence, then the matter should be put to the factfinder. Steffensen. at 486.
But in the absence of proof on the issue of causation, there is no evidence upon which a jury
could make reasonable inferences and hence the jury would be left to speculate on the issue
of causation.
After considering the arguments and extensive briefs presented by counsel, the Court
determines that as to defendants Farmer's Insurance, State Farm Insurance, MacArthur,
Colovich, and Hopkin no direct evidence exists on the issue of causation as to these
defendants. In fact, plaintiffs own expert, Mr. Duvall, was asked in his deposition whether
he would be able to determine the mechanism of plaintiffs injury without speculating or
guessing. His response was "no."
This Court has been unable to determine from the arguments presented any exact
mechanism for plaintiffs injury. The Court finds that any finding as to proximate cause
would be the result of speculation. This case, under plaintiffs present theories, would not
only be problematic for a jury, it would require jurors to engage in rank speculation to reach
a verdict. That result would not be fair, nor just, nor appropriate for any of the parties.
Accordingly, the Court grants these defendants 's Motions for Summary Judgment. The
Court denies defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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A-2. Court's Minute Entry, Sua Sponte, To Amend
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Cout
Utah Cowrty, Stoto ot Utah.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CARMA B. SMITH. Ctark

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY CLARK
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 910400220
Judge Lynn W. Davis

v.
FARMER'S INSURANCE, et. al.,
Defendants.

The Court has recently entered a ruling in the the above case. The Court has granted
summary judgment to all the defendants, except defendant Gilbert. The Court inadvertently
failed to include defendant Woolstenhulme motion for summary judgment as being included
in the granting of summary judgment. The Court will include an Amended Ruling on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment which includes the granting of summary
judgment to defendant Woolstenhulme.
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A-3. Court's Amended Ruling on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment

F ILE0
• —rth Judicial 0»£' ; ' r '~urt
i. « CouAiy, Stat*.
wi.
SARMA a. 8MiT.-.. Cierk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
BRADLEY M. CLARK,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED RULING ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

Case No. 910400220

FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, etal.,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendants Farmer's Insurance Exchange, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, MacArthur, Colovich, Hopkins, Gilbert and Woostenhulm. On April 15, 1993,
the Court heard oral argument on the motions. The Court, having duly considered the
arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following:
RULING
A motion for summary judgment may only be granted when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.Pro
56. In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to support a finding of (1) a duty to plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a causal
link between the negligent conduct of the defendant and the injury suffered by plaintiff, and
(4) damages. The issue before the Court is, given the facts as alleged by plaintiff, whether

plaintiffs allegations can support a finding of proximate causation as to each defendant. For
the purpose of summary judgment only, the Court will assume without deciding that plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part of the defendants.
Proximate causation can be defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause — the one that necessarily
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Mitchell at 245-46. Additionally,
plaintiff bears the burden to show initially that the defendants conduct was a "substantial
causative factor" leading to plaintiffs injury. Mitchell at 246.
This case can be compared to the facts in Mitchell. In Mitchell, plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action after Mr. Mitchell was found dead in his hotel room. Plaintiffs were
successful in alleging facts sufficient to establish negligent conduct but the court determined
that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any direct evidence linking Mitchell's death and the
alleged negligent conduct. The court found that since there was an absence of direct
evidence on causation, the jury would be left to speculation. Mitchell at 246. The court
stated that "[w]hen proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a
matter of law." Id.; Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah
1982).
While it is true that the issue of proximate cause is generally considered a question of
fact, the court may take the question away from the factfinder when appropriate.

Mitchell
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v. Pearson Enterprises, 687 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). See also Steffensen v. Smith's
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991). If reasonable inferences can be
drawn from the evidence, then the matter should be put to the factfinder. Steffensen. at 486.
But in the absence of proof on the issue of causation, there is no evidence upon which a jury
could make reasonable inferences and hence the jury would be left to speculate on the issue
of causation.
After considering the arguments and extensive briefs presented by counsel, the Court
determines that as to defendants Farmer's Insurance, State Farm Insurance, MacArthur,
Colovich, Hopkin, and Woolstenhulme no direct evidence exists on the issue of causation as
to these defendants. In fact, plaintiff's own expert, Mr. Duvall, was asked in his deposition
whether he would be able to determine the mechanism of plaintiffs injury without
speculating or guessing. His response was "no."
This Court has been unable to determine from the arguments presented any exact
mechanism for plaintiffs injury. The Court finds that any finding as to proximate cause
would be the result of speculation. This case, under plaintiffs present theories, would not
only be problematic for a jury, it would require jurors to engage in rank speculation to reach
a verdict. That result would not be fair, nor just, nor appropriate for any of the parties.
Accordingly, the Court grants these defendants 's Motions for Summary Judgment. The
Court denies defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Dated at Provo, this^f day of

ST^'

£ - , 1993.
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BY THE COURT

^Jt&ge Lynn W. Davis
cc:

James G. Clark, Esq.
Richard K. Spratley, Esq.
Robert L. Jeffs, Esq.
Michael P. Zaccheo, Esq.
Aaron Alma Nelson, Esq.
Paul M. Belnap, Esq.
D. Richard Smith, Esq.
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ROBERT L. JEFFS, #4349
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
Farmers Insurance Exchange and
Jennifer MacArthur
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRADLEY M. CLARK,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H.
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON
V. HOLBROOK, DONALD S.
COLOVICH, WILLIAM T. HOPKINS,
DAREN G. WOOLSTENHULME,
JENNIFER MacARTHUR, RITA M.
KENNEDY and/or U.S. FOREST
SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, and
JOHN Does 1 through 5,

Civil No. 910400220
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.

This matter came regularly and duly before the Court on April 15, 1993, on
Defendants', Farmers Insurance Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme,
Donald S. Colovich, Marcus Gilbert and Jennifer MacArthur, Motions for Summary Judgment.

Counsel in appearance were James G. Clark, counsel for Plaintiff; Mark Taylor, counsel for
Donald S. Colovich; Michael P. Zaccheo, counsel for Daren G. Woolstenhulme; Harold
Peterson, counsel for Marcus Gilbert; Paul M. Belnap, counsel for State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company; and Robert L. Jeffs, counsel for Farmers Insurance Exchange
and Jennifer MacArthur. The Court having considered the memoranda filed and the arguments
of counsel and being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
The Court hereby denies Defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court hereby grants the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants, Farmers Insurance
Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich and Jennifer
MacArthur dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint against said Defendants, Farmers Insurance
Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich and Jennifer
MacArthur with prejudice, and awarding costs to Defendants as follows: Defendants, Farmers
Insurance Exchange and Jennifer MacArthur the sum of $ /, £ /%/>^Defendant, State Farm
Insurance the sum of $

•

; Defendant, Daren G. Woolstenhulme the sum of

$ / ^ / ^ f ; and Defendant, Donald S. Colovich the sum of $ / ^ C < £ 7
.•*-*&^

DATED and signed this V _ E _ l ^ & y

of

\^77r^A—

February, 1994.

\ \ BY THE COURT

Lynn W. Davis
District Judge

Dated at Provo, this £ £ day of

/^&*'

£~ , 1993.

BY THE COURT

/ J u d g e Lynn W. Davis
cc:

James G. Clark, Esq.
Richard K. Spratley, Esq.
Robert L. Jeffs, Esq.
Michael P. Zaccheo, Esq.
Aaron Alma Nelson, Esq.
Paul M. Belnap, Esq.
D. Richard Smith, Esq.
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ROBERT L. JEFFS, #4349
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
Farmers Insurance Exchange and
Jennifer MacArthur
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRADLEY M. CLARK,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

|
|

vs.

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H.
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON
V. HOLBROOK. DONALD S.
COLOVICH, WILLIAM T. HOPKINS,
DAREN G. WOOLSTENHULME,
JENNIFER MacARTHUR, RITA M.
KENNEDY and/or U.S. FOREST
SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, and
JOHN Does 1 through 5,
Defendants.

|
|
|
|
|
|

Civil No. 910400220
Judge Lynn W. Davis

I

This matter came regularly and duly before the Court on April 15, 1993, on
Defendants', Farmers Insurance Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme,

Donald S. Colovich, Marcus Gilbert and Jennifer MacArthur, Motions for Summary Judgment.
Counsel in appearance were James G. Clark, counsel for Plaintiff; Mark Taylor, counsel for
Donald S. Colovich; Michael P. Zaccheo, counsel for Daren G. Woolstenhulme; Harold
Peterson, counsel for Marcus Gilbert; Paul M. Belnap, counsel for State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company; and Robert L. Jeffs, counsel for Farmers Insurance Exchange
and Jennifer MacArthur. The Court having considered the memoranda filed and the arguments
of counsel and being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows;
The Court hereby denies Defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court hereby grants the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants, Farmers Insurance
Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich and Jennifer
MacArthur dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint against said Defendants, Farmers Insurance
Exchange, State Farm Insurance, Daren G. Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich and Jennifer
MacArthur with prejudice, and awarding said Defendants costs against Plaintiff as may be
hereafter established.
DATED and signed this
/..

*

/J7

day of February, 1994.
\

BY THE COURT

W. Davis
District Judge
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Robert L. Jeffs
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PO Box 888
Provo UT 84603
Michael P. Zaccheo
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
PO BOX 2465
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Mark J. Taylor
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